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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DECISIONS FROM THE OCTOBER
2007 TERM
Susan N. Herman*
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES
There were quite a number of criminal procedure cases de-
cided this past term, and I thought I would start with the two most
important of the term to make sure that we have time to discuss them.
Those are the two Eighth Amendment cases. One is about how the
death penalty is implemented, and the other about when it may be
imposed; both cases focused on the definition of cruel and unusual
punishment.
A. Baze v. Rees
Baze v. Rees' was a case much in the news. I am sure you
must have read about it at the time, because after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the question of whether or not Kentucky's
method of giving lethal injections was cruel and unusual, there was a
* Susan N. Herman is the Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A widely
regarded expert on the Supreme Court, she has written a number of amicus briefs for the Su-
preme Court in the areas of criminal procedure and constitutional law. Professor Herman
also serves as President of the American Civil Liberties Union. This Article is based on a
presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's Tenth Annual Supreme Court Review
Program in New York, New York. Footnotes were drafted by members of the Touro Law
Review staff.
128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
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question about what other states should then do.2 Many other states
ended up staying their executions while Baze was pending so that
they could see what the Supreme Court would say.3 As it turned out,
they did not have to worry. The lethal injection method that Ken-
tucky used, which employed three drugs in combination, was the
method of execution used in thirty-six of the thirty-eight of the states
that permit capital punishment.4 To give you a sense of the signifi-
cance of this issue, since the Supreme Court put capital punishment
back on track in 1976 by ruling that it was permissible, 5 952 execu-
tions have taken place by lethal injection; 155 by electric chair,
eleven by gas chamber, three by hanging, and two by firing squad.6
As you may have read at the time, this three drug cocktail that
Kentucky and most other jurisdictions used had become the state of
the art. One argument made by the defendant in this case was that
the three different drugs in the cocktail had been selected partially
because one of the drugs that is given early on prevents the person
being executed from showing any effects of the later drug that would
actually end up killing him.7 Therefore, a defendant would be unable
to communicate whether he or she was in terrible pain. This is some-
2 Alison Nathan, Pausing the Machinery of Death: The Supreme Court Takes Baze,
JURIST- LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Sept. 27, 2007,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/09/pausing-machinery-of-death-supreme.php.
3 Bill Mears, High Court Upholds Lethal Injection Method, CNN.com, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/16/scotus.injections/index.html.
4 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
5 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180-81 (1976).
6 As of October 1, 2008, 952 executions have taken place by lethal injection, 155 by elec-
tric chair, eleven by gas chamber, three by hanging, and two by firing squad. See Clark
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, U.S. Executions Since 1976,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
7 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530.
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thing that is obviously extremely difficult to prove, whether someone
on the brink of dying and who cannot communicate is in terrible pain.
The big question for the Supreme Court was what standard
would be applied in evaluating the constitutional claim. The Su-
preme Court, in a seven-to-two decision, with the opinion written by
Chief Justice Roberts, adopted a standard that is quite difficult for a
person facing execution to meet.8 Justice Roberts said that execution
is only cruel and unusual if the method that is used presents "a sub-
stantial or objectively intolerable risk of serious harm." 9 The refusal
to adopt an alternative, allegedly less painful procedure is cruel and
unusual only if it can be demonstrated that there is an alternative that
is feasible, readily implemented and, in fact, significantly reduces a
substantial risk of severe pain. 10 I am sure that you will remember
from your first year of Constitutional Law that in the land of stan-
dards, it is all about the adjectives and adverbs. So the fact that the
defendant had to prove all of those things and establish that there
would be a substantial risk of severe pain is quite a heavy burden,
which the Court held was not met in this case. 1
By way of contrast, the only two dissenters, Justices Ginsburg
and Souter, said that the question should have been "if the omission
' Id. at 1531.
9 Id. at 1522.
10 Id. at 1532. The Court went on to say:
If a State refuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these docu-
mented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for ad-
hering to its current method of execution, then a State's refusal to change
its method can be viewed as "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment.
Id.
" Id. at 1533.
2009]
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of those safeguards posed an untoward and readily avoidable risk of
inflicting severe and unnecessary pain., 12 So that was the choice,
which standard to adopt, and the Court adopted the more stringent
choice, decreasing the possibility that a defendant will prevail on
such a claim.
There were also two concurrences in Baze. One was by Jus-
tice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, who said that the standard that
the Court actually adopted was far too liberal, and that, in fact, an
execution method should only be considered to be cruel and unusual
if it was used deliberately in order to inflict pain. 3 That is interesting
because it sets forth the more extreme views of Thomas and Scalia,
who outflank the majority. What is also interesting to me is that this
was a seven-to-two decision, where Justices Roberts and Alito did
not join Thomas and Scalia. 14 Instead, they joined the opinion adopt-
ing the more moderate standard, and gave defendants some opportu-
nity, more than they would have had under the Thomas and Scalia
standard, to show that a particular execution method is cruel and un-
usual. 15
The other concurrence, which is a concurrence in the judg-
ment, reminded me of Professor Neuborne's observation that some of
12 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 1548 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[O]ur society has moved away from public and painful retribution to-
wards ever more humane forms of punishment. State-sanctioned killing
is therefore becoming more and more anachronistic. In an attempt to
bring executions in line with our evolving standards of decency, we have
adopted increasingly less painful methods of execution, and then de-
clared previous methods barbaric and archaic.
Id.
14 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525.
15 Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 25590
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Justice Stevens's apparently deeply held beliefs are finally coming
out after all of his many years on the Court. Justice Stevens wrote a
concurrence basically saying that he has had it with the death penalty
and no longer thinks that the death penalty can be regarded as consti-
tutional. 16 His opinion was very reminiscent to me of Harry Black-
mun, after twenty years of sitting on the Court saying, "I no longer
shall tinker with the machinery of death."'17 Justice Stevens was not
quite that pithy. But after the decision, he was discussing the Ken-
tucky Derby and posited that the method used to put down a horse is
more humane than the method employed by Kentucky and thirty-five
other states during the lethal injection process."8
At Justice Alito's confirmation hearing, Senator Feingold had
asked then-Judge Alito about his views on the death penalty in a col-
loquy I found to be very interesting. Feingold told Alito that he has
seen Justice after Justice go up to the Supreme Court and, after get-
ting a good view of what happens in capital punishment cases around
the country, becoming much more distressed about capital punish-
ment generally (as may have happened to Justice Stevens). Feingold
wondered aloud what would happen to Alito once he became a Jus-
16 Id. at 1551.
I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the
imposition of the death penalty represents "the pointless and needless ex-
tinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social
or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State
[is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
17 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994).
18 Monica Mercer, Chattanooga: Stevens Addresses Lethal Injections, CHATTANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, May 10, 2008,
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2008/may/ I 0/chattanooga-stevens-addresses-lethal-
injections/.
2009]
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tice. 9
B. Kennedy v. Louisiana
The other blockbuster capital case last term, Kennedy v. Lou-
* 20isiana, gave us something of a preliminary answer to that question.
Baze v. Rees was a seven-to-two decision about the method of execu-
* 21tion. Kennedy considered what is cruel and unusual punishment in
terms of when somebody may be executed by any method at all.
Both Justices Alito and Roberts, this time, voted with the minority in
a five-to-four decision, and would have upheld imposing execution
for people who commit the crime of raping a child.22
This was the only five-to-four decision in the criminal proce-
dure area last term. The decision was written by the eponymous Jus-
tice Kennedy. 3 Interestingly, Kennedy adopted principles that were
broader than needed for this actual case. First, he announced that it
would be cruel and unusual punishment to be executed for any crime
committed against an individual other than homicide.24 Crimes
against the state, like treason, terrorism crimes, and drug kingpin
crimes, were distinguished from crimes against the individual.25 It is
remarkable that Justice Kennedy now has mapped out all of this terri-
19 U.S. Sen. Judiciary Comm. Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito
to the U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Russ Feingold, Member, Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee).
2 128 S. Ct. at 2641 (2008).
21 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525.
22 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2659 ("As it relates to crimes against individuals ... the death penalty should not
be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken").
25 Id.
[Vol. 25
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tory. The decision was even more extraordinary because the Court,
by a bare majority, was willing to play a classic countermajoritarian
role. Both presidential candidates (including now President Obama)
disavowed the Court's result.26 In a Quinnipiac University poll, most
people responding thought that it was proper to impose the death
penalty for child rape. 27 In addition to providing this general pre-
scription for handling future challenges, Justice Kennedy employed
three different arguments in reaching his result, each of which is quite
remarkable. He started by adopting a principle of parsimony. "When
the law punishes by death," he said, "it risks its own sudden descent
into brutality., 28 Therefore he characterized the death penalty as sus-
pect, saying that the Court should be careful not to allow its imposi-
tion any more often than necessary. He described capital punishment
law concerning homicide as tremendously confused, striving for
some consistency in punishment on the one hand, while on the other
hand insisting on giving individual defendants the right to make their
best case for not being executed.29 Essentially what Justice Kennedy
is saying is that capital punishment law is difficult; it is really messy,
and the Court should not tolerate that same mess in additional con-
texts because that would not be consistent with the principle of par-
simony. That is one very intriguing argument for the Justice at the
center of the Court to be endorsing.
26 Michael Doyle, Kennedy has Come to Define Supreme Court's Center, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jul. 6, 2009, http://www.sacbee.com/1 11/story/1062867.html.
27 Quinnipiac University Poll, Jul. 17, 2008,
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/xl295.xml?ReleaseID=l 194.
28 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
29 Id.
2009]
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The second supporting argument he made is that the Court
should follow, as it has in earlier cases, objective indicia of what so-
ciety regards as cruel and unusual, and that those indicia disfavored
capital punishment for child rape.3" In the case of Roper v. Simmons,
the Supreme Court had said that it is cruel and unusual to execute ju-
veniles. 31 And the Court had previously said, in Atkins v. Virginia,
that it is also cruel and unusual to execute the mentally retarded.32 In
both of those cases, the methods the Supreme Court had used to
gauge society's views were quite controversial. First, the Court
looked at what other countries do. Justice Kennedy has gotten
around a lot and he knows something about what other countries do.
He knows that most countries do not approve of our capital punish-
ment practices. 33 Also, in both Roper and Atkins, the Court counted
how many states in fact authorized the kind of execution at issue in
order to try to get a sense of how unusual the punishment was, in ad-
dition to how cruel. In those cases, there were about thirty states that
did and twenty states that did not, or thirty that did and eighteen that
did not.34 In this case, when Justice Kennedy counted the noses of
how many state legislatures permitted capital punishment for the rape
of a child, the number of pro states he came up with was six. Louisi-
ana had enacted its statute in 1995, 35and five states had followed suit
by adopting statutes authorizing capital punishment for the rape of a
30 Id.
" 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
32 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
33 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
34 Id. at 579, app'x A.I.; See also Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653.
35 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651.
594 [Vol. 25
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child.36
Therefore, Justice Kennedy said, by subtraction, forty-four
states and the federal government do not make this punishment avail-
able for this crime.37 Louisiana had a couple of different arguments
in response to this assessment. The first argument was based on
trends. They argued that there are more state legislatures considering
whether to join Louisiana by adopting such statutes. 38 Justice Ken-
nedy said no, this kind of trend in progress does not count. In count-
ing noses, the Court does not care if legislatures are considering
modifying their laws; it only cares about what they have actually
done.39
The second argument that Louisiana made is that there is an
explanation for why most states do not, in fact, have a death penalty
for child rape even if they might wish to. In 1977, the Supreme
Court, in the case of Coker v. Georgia, ruled that it is cruel and un-
usual punishment to execute people for rape. 40 Therefore, the state
argued, all the states are doing is following what they think the Su-
preme Court has demanded that they do. Because the states did not
feel empowered to make this decision, Louisiana argued, one must
discount the fact that they have already adopted statutes making child
rape a capital crime.
Justice Kennedy responded that the states should be able to
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2652.
38 Id. at 2656-57.
39 Id. at 2669.
40 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("We have concluded that a sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.").
2009]
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understand the distinction between adult rape and child rape, as Lou-
isiana had.4 1 The Court had never said that capital punishment for
child rape would be cruel and unusual punishment.42 This is an inter-
esting argument too. After finding that there are only five states do-
ing what Louisiana does, the Court concluded that this punishment is
unusual, as well as cruel. Justice Kennedy also looked at actual exe-
cution practices, and reported that there has not been any execution in
this country for a child rape since 1964.43 The state of Louisiana ar-
gued that such executions would have been deemed unconstitutional
because of Coker,44 but Justice Kennedy again gave the states greater
credit for legal acumen.45
Kennedy's third argument, after talking about the principle of
parsimony and objective indicia of what is cruel and unusual, was
based on the principle of proportionality. Justice Kennedy acknowl-
edged that child rape is a horrible crime, but said that it still is not the
same as killing somebody. It is not irrevocable; it is not as severe.
The perpetrator is not taking someone's life away.46 Second of all, he
said there would be a tremendous increase in the number of execu-
41 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2648-49 ("[N]oting that, while Coker bars the use of the death
penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman, it left open the question which, if any,
other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment."). Louisiana believed that the two situations were distinguishable. Because " 'chil-
dren are a class that need special protection,' "the state court reasoned, the rape of a child is
unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the victim and our society." Id.
42 See id. at 2650.
41 Id. at 2643-44.
44 See id. at 2650.
41 Id. ("[T]he [Coker] Court held it would be unconstitutional to execute an offender who
had raped an adult woman.").
46 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2654 ("Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment;
but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not
compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.") (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
596 [Vol. 25
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tions if the Court allowed executions for child rape as well as homi-
cide,47 which is obviously only a bad thing if one accepts his first
principle of parsimony out of general concern about the death pen-
alty.
And finally, Justice Kennedy said that if capital punishment
were available for child rape, that would mean that very often there
would be child victims testifying at a capital trial, and their testimony
can be quite unreliable. a When you get to that part of the opinion,
you begin to understand why Justice Kennedy started his opinion,
even though he was going to hold that it was cruel and unusual to
execute the defendant for this crime, with a detailed description of the
crime itself. The details were horrific, but what had also happened in
this case was that the child, Mr. Kennedy's stepdaughter, had initially
told an entirely different story, identifying someone else as the rapist.
After about twenty-one months, she changed her story and said that it
had been her stepfather who had done it.49 Whether or not there was
any doubt about the accuracy of the verdict in this case, the malle-
ability of the young victim's testimony seemed to Kennedy to por-
tend a risk of executing the innocent in some case. So this principle
of proportionality, encompassing concern about the reliability of the
testimony on which the predicate conviction would be based, became
the third basis for Justice Kennedy's decision.
There was a very interesting sequel to this story, concerning
the power of the press-individual bloggers as well as the profes-
41 Id. at 2672.
48 Id. at 2663.
49 Id. at 2647.
2009] 597
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sional press. Somebody wrote on a blog that Justice Kennedy had ac-
tually made a mistake in his opinion, because it was not true that
forty-four states and the federal government did not permit capital
punishment for child rape. 50 The blog pointed out that in 2006, Con-
gress had amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
to permit execution for the rape of a child.5' Linda Greenhouse
picked this up, published the fact in the New York Times, and called
the lawyers involved to solicit their comments. 52 She asked the peo-
ple in Louisiana, "are you going to petition for rehearing in light of
this discrepancy?" They said "Ummm." The State did decide to pe-
tition for a rehearing.53 And in terms of lawyer stories, I thought it
was extremely interesting that the petition for a rehearing on the basis
that the Supreme Court made a mistake in its opinion was signed by
both Viet Dinh and Neil Kumar Katyal, lawyers who had been on
opposing sides in many other cases concerning, for example, terror-
ism issues.54
That rehearing petition is still pending. I think it is extremely
unlikely that the Supreme Court will take back its decision and redo
the whole case, and say never mind because of the UCMJ. Very pos-
sibly they will have to write a corrected opinion in which they leave
out or modify the blanket statement about federal law. The opinion
50 Don Cruse, Perils of Fifty-State Surveys: Kennedy v. Louisiana, Supreme Court of
Texas Blog (July 3, 2008), http://www.scotxblog.com/practice-notes/perils-of-fifty-state-
surveys/ (last visited March 14, 2009).
"' Id. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 11 (West 2007).
52 Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2008, at Al.
53 See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy, 2008 WL 4414670 (U.S. Apr. 23,
2008).
54 id.
598 [Vol. 25
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might change, the numbers might change, but the constitutional rul-
ing is unlikely to change.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
I will move on to discuss the one and only Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment case this year, Virginia v. Moore.55 I should ad-
mit that I wrote an amicus brief on the losing side and lost unani-
mously. And I thought it was a much more difficult case than the
Supreme Court apparently did.
Here is what happened. The case involved some absolutely
bizarre coincidences which are not mentioned in the Supreme Court's
opinion. Virginia state troopers stopped a man named David Lee
Moore because they believed that he was driving with a suspended
license. The reason they thought this was that a dispatcher had said
that a guy with the nickname Chubs was driving with a suspended li-
cense. And one of the troopers happened to know that David Lee
Moore used the nickname Chubs. It turned out that he was not the
same person that the dispatcher was talking about, but a different per-
son nicknamed Chubs. Oddly enough, though, David Lee Moore was
indeed driving with a suspended license.56
So the police arrested him. The actual reason for the arrest
quickly became apparent: once they arrested Moore, the troopers
asked him if they could just take him back to his motel room and
asked him to consent to a search of his motel room, which he did.
When they got to the room, one of the officers suddenly realized that
" 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
56 Id. at 1601.
20091 599
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they had neglected to conduct a search incident to arrest of Moore
himself (which suggested that they did not regard him as dangerous).
The officer then searched him and, bottom line, they found the drugs
which became the basis for the prosecution in question. 7
Moore moved to exclude the drugs. His argument was that
his arrest was not legal under Virginia law.58 There is a very clear
Virginia statute stating that if an officer stops somebody for driving
with a suspended license, the officer is supposed to issue him or her a
citation. They are not permitted to take the person into custody.
59
One exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
is that officers can perform a search incident to a lawful arrest.60 But
this arrest was not lawful. I have tried describing this case to differ-
ent groups of lawyers and non-lawyers, including to a group of teach-
ers participating in a Street Law program. They were given the rele-
vant Supreme Court precedents to read and told the facts of this case.
They overwhelmingly thought, "How can you possibly allow the evi-
dence when the arrest never should have been made?" That is what
the Virginia Supreme Court thought too, unanimously. All seven of
the justices on the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the troop-
ers should not have arrested Moore in the first place and therefore
found the evidence resulting from the search incident to that arrest to
be inadmissible.61
7 Id. at 1601-02.
s Id. at 1602.
59 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (West 2008).
60 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
210 (4th ed. 2004).
61 Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 636 S.E.2d 395, 400 (Va. 2006) ("The officers
were authorized to issue only a summons ... the officers could not lawfully conduct a full
600 [Vol. 25
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A couple of years later, the United States Supreme Court
heard the case on appeal and reversed, also unanimously. 62 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, starting his analysis, of course,
with common law. He went back to the eighteenth century to answer
the question of whether or not an arrest in violation of a state law
should in fact result in an exclusion of evidence under the federal
constitution. 63 He found that there is no conclusive common law his-
tory, but nevertheless concluded that no one in the eighteenth century
really worried about what the positive law in the statutes said. He
talked, as he has in the past, about the need for national uniformity in
Fourth Amendment law.64 And we all know from recent decisions
that Justice Scalia just does not like the exclusionary rule.65 That is
what this case is all about: Why should the Court allow the federal
exclusionary rule to be used in a Virginia case, when Virginia itself
was not willing to use the exclusionary rule for a violation of its state
law?
The Virginia Supreme Court had its hands tied because Vir-
ginia law states that unless the legislature provides that evidence
should be excluded, there is no exclusionary remedy.66 The Virginia
state constitution was useless.67
field-type search.").
62 Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1601.
63 Id. at 1602-04.
64 id. at 1604.
65 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) ("The exclusionary rule gen-
erates 'substantial social costs' which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dan-
gerous at large") (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); Pennsylvania Bd.
of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2021 (1998) ("The exclusionary rule fre-
quently requires extensive litigation...").
66 McCarter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 566 S.E.2d 868, 869 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
67 See VA. CONST. art. VI (the search and seizure provision does not prohibit unreasonable
2009]
15
Herman: Criminal Procedure Decisions from the October 2007 Term
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
TOURO LAWREVIEW
The reason I wrote an amicus brief in this case, even though I
predicted that the result would be what it was, was that this case was
the third strike against the possibility of meaningful Fourth Amend-
ment limitations on arbitrary and discriminatory police conduct. Jus-
tice Scalia wrote a decision in 1996 in a case called Whren v. United
States, the first strike, where he said that if an officer decided to stop
someone for a traffic offense, like driving a mile over the speed limit
or turning without signaling, that stop would be reasonable as long as
the officer had probable cause to believe that the driver really had
committed the traffic offense68 Under Whren, the Court does not
look at what the officer's subjective intent was. 69 Even if the traffic
stop was a pretext, it would be permissible for the officer to conduct
an arrest and then to search the arrestee and his or her vehicle.7°
The second strike, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the "soccer
Mom" case, said that if an officer has probable cause to believe that
somebody has committed an offense, even a traffic infraction like a
child not wearing a seat belt, punishable only by a maximum of a $50
fine, that officer can conduct an arrest and a search incident to ar-
rest.7 Arrest for minor fine-only offenses will not be considered un-
reasonable. I have argued in my briefs in these cases that to allow
pretextual arrests for minor traffic infractions is to invite and condone
racial profiling.72 Justice Souter, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
searches and seizures, but provides only narrower protection).
68 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
69 Id. at 813.
'a Id. at 819.
71 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
72 See ACLU Amicus Brief in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2000/22305lgl200010O1.html;
602 [Vol. 25
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asked how often it would happen that a particular officer wanted to
arrest a soccer mom whose child was not wearing a seat belt.73 The
real answer is that officers arrest people all the time because they
want to see if they have drugs in the car. If you give officers a basis
and make it really easy, then you are going to have officers who en-
gage in racial profiling; you will have officers stopping whomever
they want, ostensibly for traffic infractions, in order to search them
for drugs. Is there anyone in this room who has never driven a mile
over the speed limit, eaten on the subway, or ridden a bicycle in
downtown Orlando, Florida while failing to have a bell or gong?74
These are all arrestable offenses which then become the predicate for
full searches of one's body and one's car. The search incident to ar-
rest doctrine is stood on its head and becomes an arrest incident to the
desire to search authority. Even if the Fourth Amendment is not read
to impose any subjective or objective limitations on what constitutes
a "reasonable" arrest, providing that officers must, at least, comply
with state-imposed limitations on the arrest power and consequently
the search power (allowing searches only pursuant to a lawful arrest)
would have been a last ditch means of imposing some sort of limit on
what otherwise amount to general searches. Instead, the Supreme
Court has now confirmed that officers have a blank check to engineer
a search of virtually anyone who drives a vehicle.
Now, this ties into something I would like to say to follow up
on earlier discussion about the Second Amendment. You all remem-
http://www.aclu.org/scotus/1995/23049prs19960628.html (describing the Whren amicus
brief).
" Id. at 353 n.25.
74 See Thomas v. Florida, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993).
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ber from Constitutional Law the theory of incorporation, that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates certain Bill of Rights provi-
sions. So if the Fourth Amendment is going to apply to the state of
Virginia, it only applies to the state of Virginia because the Four-
teenth Amendment came along in the nineteenth century.
There is a concurrence in Virginia v. Moore by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who uses one word that I think is just fascinating. She said
that this case is not as easy as the majority is making it, because the
law in the "nineteenth" century might not clearly have allowed this
form of police discretion 5 (as opposed to the eighteenth century law
Justice Scalia consulted).
Justice Ginsburg is onto an extremely interesting question
about which era originalists should consult. Between the drafting of
the Fourth Amendment and the drafting of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (the vehicle for incorporating the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tions to state law), there were a lot of changes in thinking about when
federal constitutional authority was needed to limit what a state can
do. I think the Virginia Supreme Court's frustration in this case is a
very good example of why federal power is needed to protect the
rights of people in Virginia. There was not enough political will in
the state of Virginia to exclude evidence resulting from an unlawful
arrest. Therefore, Moore looked to federal law to protect him against
the state's failure to follow through on its declaration that his arrest
was illegal. During the nineteenth century, just before the framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment, search and seizure authority was being
75 See Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1609 n. 1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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used against freed men and slaves in horrifying ways; people were
picked up and arrested all the time if they did not have their freedom
papers on them, for example. The Fourteenth Amendment could eas-
ily be read to interpose federal constitutional protection between the
state and an individual like Moore, who was being targeted by state
law enforcement personnel possibly (even if perhaps unconsciously)
on the basis of his race.76
I think there is a similar argument to be made when the Court
gets to the question of incorporation of the Second Amendment. In
the nineteenth century, a lot of the slave states had laws prohibiting
black people from owning guns even after they were freed.77 During
the nineteenth century, there was a strong feeling among the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment that freed slaves had to have a right to
own a gun, because no one else was going to defend them. Freed
slaves had the Ku Klux Klan after them; they did not have the sher-
iffs in Mississippi coming to their defense. Thus, they needed the
ability to own a gun. That opens a very interesting question about
nineteenth century originalism, something the Court has given zero
attention to. If the question is whether to apply a Bill of Rights pro-
vision to the states, which is more relevant, the intent of the eight-
eenth century framers of the Second Amendment, or the intent of the
nineteenth century framers of the Due Process Clause? If you are in-
terested in researching the possibilities of this type of argument,
Akhil Amar wrote a very interesting book called The Bill of Rights:
76 See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006).
77 Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview, 28 CRIME & JUST.
137, 159 (2001).
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Creation and Reconstruction, which began to explore this subject.78
One thing is consistent in the Fourth Amendment cases heard
by the Court following September 11, 2001: the results. Of twenty-
three cases decided, the Fourth Amendment lost twenty times.79
Thus, the results have been consistent. Even though all of the cases
are about drugs and guns, it seems evident that what is in the minds
of the Justices is empowering law enforcement officials to find terror-
ists.1°
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
By comparison, the Sixth Amendment fares much better in
the Supreme Court than the Fourth Amendment. One reason for this
is that Antonin Scalia is very fond of the Sixth Amendment. We
know where Scalia is on the Confrontation Clause. He is on the
tough side of it. You may recall that a few years back in the Craw-
ford case, Scalia led the Court in a wholesale renovation of the right
of confrontation. 81
A. Confrontation Clause
Last year there was one new Confrontation Clause case-
Giles v. California.82 When you read the description, you think, oh, I
78 See generally AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
ch. 4, at 64 (1998).
79 As of October 29, 2008, a search conducted on Westlaw returned twenty-three Fourth
Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court since September 11, 2001. Of these cases,
the Fourth Amendment lost twenty times. Search terms used were "fourth amendment" &
"search and seizure" & da(aft 9/11/2001).
80 See Illinos v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
81 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
82 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
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know what the answer to that is going to be. In this case, Mr. Giles
was accused of killing his former girlfriend, and during the trial the
court admitted into evidence statements the victim had made impli-
cating him in the murder, even though the statements had not been
subject to cross-examination. 83 Under the Crawford rules, the state-
ment had not been cross-examined and therefore, it should not have
been admitted. The statement was certainly "testimonial" within the
meaning of Crawford. So, the question was whether the statement
would fall within an exception.84
The potential exception in Giles involved what is referred to
as the "forfeiture doctrine"-an exception to confrontation which has
been around for a while. Under this doctrine, if a defendant kills a
person in order to keep that person from testifying, the defendant
cannot complain that the witness is unavailable for cross-
examination-the right of confrontation has been forfeited.85 This
was the Supreme Court's question on certiorari: whether the defen-
dant in this case forfeited his right of confrontation on the ground that
he killed the witness? 86 What do you think the Justices said? I would
bet that your guess is wrong.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in this case-a six-
to-three opinion-answering the question in the negative, and basing
his answer on the common law. He went back to the old English law
books and said no, this is not what they meant by the forfeiture doc-
" Id. at 2681-82.
84 Id. at 2682.
85 Id. at 2683.
86 Id.
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trine. The forfeiture doctrine was deemed to apply only if the defen-
dant intentionally killed the witness in order to prevent his or her tes-
timony.87 He rooted this conclusion in a close textual analysis of
those dusty cases. To me, a more persuasive explanation of the con-
clusion of the Court is found in Justice Souter's concurring opinion. 88
Justice Souter thought that applying the forfeiture doctrine in this
case would be illogical and circular. If in a homicide prosecution the
state is trying to prove that the defendant killed his former girlfriend
and is allowed to use evidence only because he allegedly killed his
former girlfriend, we have a problem. The proof can only be used if
the result is already proved, but maybe the result cannot be proved
unless the proof is admitted. In any event, it is a very interesting rul-
ing because the defendant was so unsympathetic a figure.
I want to mention another case, Danforth v. Minnesota, which
involved a child victim who testified in a state court trial which took
place prior to the Court's decision in Crawford.89 The Minnesota
Supreme Court looked at a challenge to the use of that evidence,
which was presumed to violate the standards set forth in Crawford,
and pondered whether Crawford would be applied retroactively by
the Supreme Court.90
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly guessed that the Su-
preme Court was going to decline to apply Crawford retroactively. 9'
" Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683-85.
88 Id. at 2708 (Souter, J., concurring).
89 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008) (involving a six-year old victim of sexual abuse who did
not testify at trial).
90 Id. at 1035.
91 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
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So the Minnesota Court said okay, that would have to be our answer
too, even though Minnesota state retroactivity law would allow us to
hear this claim and give Danforth the benefit of the ruling in Craw-
ford. It is a federal constitutional claim, the court reasoned, and the
federal courts have all these principles governing the cognizability of
constitutional claims, so the state courts should just approach the
constitutional claim in the same way it would be approached in fed-
eral court.92
What was very interesting about Danforth was the fact that, in
a seven-to-two decision, a super majority, written by Justice Stevens,
the Supreme Court disagreed and said that Minnesota should have
followed its own law. The Court's retroactivity decisions are rooted
in concerns about federal habeas corpus and federalism, and therefore
Minnesota should have followed its own procedural law in consider-
ing Danforth's federal constitutional claim rather than limiting itself
in the way a federal court would have been limited.
93
Now, I think this creates a very interesting Erie94 question in
criminal procedure, and is going to lead to opportunities for the state
courts to make rulings about the meaning of federal constitutional
rights in circumstances where it would be impossible to bring those
claims into federal court. Federal habeas courts may not be able to
take part in much of the development of federal constitutional law,
precisely because of their unique procedural limitations. So whether
there will be any federal court involvement in evolving constitutional
92 Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1035.
9' Id. at 1047.
94 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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questions will depend on how many state court decisions the Su-
preme Court chooses to review. This is also a remarkable result.
B. Right to Counsel
There were two cases on the right to counsel decided this past
term, one of which was won by the defendant even if it was left un-
clear whether he would benefit from his win.
1. Rothgery v. Gillespie County
Rothgery v. Gillespie County involved a man who was ar-
rested for being a felon in possession of a weapon.95 He was then ar-
raigned. He did not get assigned a lawyer because under Texas law,
although he was indigent, he did not have the right to a lawyer until
he was indicted.96 He was locked up. About six months later when
he was finally indicted, he got a lawyer. However, he had been ask-
ing all along: "Can I please have a lawyer?" But nobody paid any at-
tention. 97
Rothgery was right to want a lawyer. The lawyer eventually
assigned to represent him turned out to be quite competent. The law-
yer promptly did an ounce of research and discovered that his client
had not been convicted of a felony after all. Therefore, not only
should Rothgery not have served time in jail (because possession of a
gun was not a crime in the absence of a previous conviction), but in
Texas he should have been a hero: he was carrying a gun and he was
9' 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008).
96 Id. at 2583.
" Id. at 2582.
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not a felon. There it is; he never should have been arrested, and he
spent months in jail before being assigned the lawyer who quickly
helped him to be exonerated and freed.98 The question in this case,
and it had been an open question, was when the right to counsel at-
taches under the Sixth Amendment.99 As in Virginia v. Moore, al-
though one would have thought that the answer would depend on the
content of state law, the Supreme Court totally ignored Texas law.
They could not have cared less what Texas provided.
Justice Souter wrote an opinion saying that the right to coun-
sel attaches when issue is joined in a criminal case. It does not really
matter whether the prosecutor is involved yet. Once the state is
committed to prosecute, that is it, you have a right to a lawyer and,
therefore, Rothgery should have been assigned a lawyer much earlier
than had happened.100 But this ruling did not mean that Rothgery
won his civil rights action. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the Court said, is functionally to protect the defen-
dant during the trial because the prosecutors are lawyers and so if
they take someone to trial, that person also has the right to be repre-
sented by a lawyer. 10 The Court concluded, based on this analysis,
that in order to win his claim, Rothgery would have to convince the
court that he was prejudiced by the violation of his right. Ordinarily,
a defendant would show prejudice by demonstrating that his trial
would have come out differently had the State not infringed his right
98 Id. at 2592.
99 Id.
10o Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2592.
101 Id. at 2583 n.8.
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to counsel-a problematic showing for Rothgery, who never went to
trial. The fact that Rothgery was locked up for all that time, the
Court said, is not a concern of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and so does not count as prejudice here. The Fourth Amendment,
and the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial address periods of il-
legal detention; the harm Rothgery suffered in being locked up would
not be pertinent to his claim that his rights were violated by the fail-
ure to assign him counsel.
The case was remanded to allow Rothgery chance to show
prejudice; so it was not clear whether Rothgery himself had actually
won anything. But, we now have an answer to the question of when
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches: any commitment to
prosecution, arraignment or indictment, whichever comes first.
2. Indiana v. Edwards
The other right to counsel case last term, also decided by a
supermajority, was Indiana v. Edwards.10 2 Mr. Edwards was some-
body who seemed to be quite troubled. He got into a shoot-out over a
shoplifting accusation. He was found competent to stand trial, but
the state court trial judge was concerned that he was not sufficiently
competent to represent himself, and so assigned counsel to represent
him even though Mr. Edwards insisted that he preferred to represent
himself. 103
The Supreme Court, through Justice Breyer, who tends to be a
pragmatist about this kind of thing, said that the state can use a dif-
102 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
103 Id. at 2382-83.
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ferent standard for competence when it comes to self-representation
than the standard used to determine whether an accused is competent
to stand trial. Therefore, the trial judge was permitted to require rep-
resentation by counsel. 10 4 The Court did not set any particular stan-
dard for deciding exactly when appointment of unwanted counsel
would be unconstitutional. The Court simply ruled that it is a possi-
bility that the state might be able to appoint a lawyer for a defendant
who does not want one.1
0 5
Justice Scalia, interestingly, dissented and would have found a
Sixth Amendment violation. The right to self-representation is about
dignity, and Mr. Edwards had a right to his dignity, said Justice
Scalia. 10 6 The majority, perhaps in response, attached to its opinion a
pleading that Mr. Edwards had filed. It was total gibberish and did
not make any sense at all.10 7 Justice Scalia nevetheless believed that
Edwards had a right to make his own decisions.
C. Right to Jury Trial
Snyder v. Louisiana1°8 is another case where a defendant won,
in one of a string of what, to me, are quite remarkable jury selection
cases: the Batson cases. I am sure that everybody here is familiar
with Batson v. Kentucky, which said that lawyers may be prohibited
from exercising a peremptory challenge against a member of a cogni-
zable racial group unless they can present a persuasive race-neutral
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2387-88.
106 Id. at 2393.
107 Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2388 (app.).
'o' 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
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explanation. 109
Snyder was a capital case in state court. Not surprisingly,
there was a lot of very active jury selection going on. The defendant
showed that five of the thirty-six jurors who were challenged by the
prosecutor were black, meeting Batson's burden of making out a
prima facie case of racial exclusion." ° The trial court found that the
prosecutor then met the burden of providing adequate race neutral
explanations for those challenges. Snyder was convicted and sen-
tenced to death."' The Louisiana appellate courts upheld the convic-
tion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the challenges
to two different black prospective jurors. The Court only discussed
one of those individuals because it held that the peremptory challenge
to that particular juror was not adequately justified. On the basis of
that finding, the Court reversed Snyder's capital conviction." 2
Here is what happened. The juror at issue was a student. The
prosecutor asked this student, "If this was a lengthy trial, might you
have a problem?" And the student said, "Gee, I don't know. I'm do-
ing student teaching, it could be a problem." The judge, upon hear-
ing this, inquired, "Is there someone at your school whom we can call
and ask?" The student said, "Sure, you can call the Dean." The
Dean said, "No problem. If he is on jury duty, that's fine. I under-
stand civic responsibility."'' 3
When it came time for challenges, the prosecutor nevertheless
109 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
"0 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1207.
11 Id.
112 Id. at 1208.
"' Id. at 1210.
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exercised a peremptory against this juror. When asked to provide a
race neutral explanation, the prosecutor offered an elaborate theory
about how the student would want to get back to student teaching
and, therefore, would be more likely to convict the defendant of a
lesser crime in order to eliminate the need for the penalty phase of the
trial, thereby allowing him to return to his student teaching earlier." 14
This theory flies in the face of what the trial judge thought had been
resolved, and did not make much sense in any event. The second
race neutral explanation the prosecutor offered was that the student
appeared to be nervous. The trial judge allowed the peremptory chal-
lenge and excused the juror." 5
When the case got to the Supreme Court, the Court held,
seven-to-two, that the explanations given were not sufficient. 16 On
the nervousness issue, there were no findings of fact made by the trial
judge; therefore, that was not regarded as an adequate race neutral
explanation. The Court thought that the trial judge should have made
findings of fact that that juror was really more nervous than the other
jurors in order to clear the bar of Batson. 17
Then the Supreme Court turned to the feeble argument about
the student teaching. The Court offered several reasons for finding
this explanation not to be credible, including the fact that the stu-
dent's Dean had said that the student would not have a problem. In
addition, the participants knew even at that time that the trial was not
11 Id. at 1210-11.
"5 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1212.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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going to be very long." 8
What is notable to me is that, in addition to the fact that this
was a seven-two decision in favor of a capital defendant, the opinion
was written by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Chief Justice Rob-
erts.119 I think it is fascinating that both Roberts and Alito seem to be
going with the Batson program. They both have quickly become true
believers in Batson. On the basis of the challenge to this one juror,
second-guessing the state court's factual findings about what consti-
tutes a credible race neutral explanation, the Court reversed a capital
conviction in Louisiana.
I wrote an article a number of years ago called "Why the
Court Loves Batson," and my thesis was that Justice Lewis Powell,
who invented the whole Batson theory, felt badly about the racism in-
fecting the whole criminal justice system, but he was not willing to
do anything direct about it.120 He was the author of not only of Bat-
son but also of the opinion in a case called McCleskey v. Kemp,
where a study which the Court presumed to be valid conclusively
showed that jurors in Georgia imposing the death penalty did so on a
racist basis.' 2' (The bias shown by the study had to do with the race
of the victim rather than the race of the defendant.) Nevertheless, the
Court ruled against McCleskey on the theory that the jury in his par-
ticular case might not have been biased. The study only showed that
many juries in Georgia were biased; not that every jury was.
lib Id. at 1210.
119 Id. at 1206.
120 Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Co-
lorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1821 (1993).
121 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
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McCleskey had no way to prove whether or not the jury in his par-
ticular case was tainted. In explaining his conclusion, Justice Powell
opined that if the Court were to set aside capital verdicts by juries in
Georgia, it might be entering a very slippery slope. The next thing
you know, he said, the Court might be expected to look at racism in
arrests, sentencing, and incarceration rates, and other aspects of the
criminal justice system.122 Justice Brennan, in dissent, accused Pow-
ell of expressing a fear of "too much justice." 123 McCleskey was one
of the decisions about which, after retiring from the Court, Powell
told audiences, "I think I got that one wrong."'' 24 I would agree. The
Batson solution, focusing on the race of decision-makers at increas-
ingly infrequent trials, is an interesting form of representation-
reinforcement, but it is no substitute for serious judicial oversight of
racist decisions in the criminal justice system.
IV. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
There are two more cases I want to describe to you in the one-
minute version. There were two quite important cases about the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines last term: Gall v. United States 25 and
Kimbrough v. United States.
1 26
You may recall, because we have talked about these cases in
previous years, that in 2005 the Supreme Court decided a case called
122 Id. at 314-19.
123 Id. at 339.
124 Howard Ball, Thurgood Marshall's Forlorn Battle Against Racial Discrimination in
the Administration of the Death Penalty: The McCleskey Cases, 1987, 1991, 27 Miss. C. L.
REV. 335, 337 (2008).
125 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
126 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
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Booker, in which a majority held that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines-which were supposed to induce uniformity in federal sentenc-
ing by providing district judges with Guidelines and by then having
appellate courts review the sentences imposed to ensure that they
conformed to the Guidelines-were unconstitutional because they did
not give the jury enough role in deciding the facts on which the sen-
tence would be based. 27 But in a shifting majority, Justice Breyer ef-
fected the coup of having the Court adopt the remedy not of striking
down the Guidelines, but of rewriting them.
28
A different five-Justice majority from the majority finding the
Guidelines unconstitutional ruled that the Guidelines would be
deemed to be advisory rather than binding, and that appellate courts
would henceforth only review district court sentences to see if they
were "reasonable.' ' 29 Naturally that decision created some enormous
questions, like, what does "reasonable" mean?
Gall dealt with one version of the question of what reasonable
means. The circuit courts were sharply split on the issue of what
standard of review to apply on appeal. The Eighth Circuit, which had
reviewed Gall's sentence and found it unreasonably lenient, held that
if a sentencing judge wants to depart as much as the district judge had
done in this case, "extraordinary circumstances" would have to be
shown. 130 The Supreme Court ruled that appellate courts may not re-
quire extraordinary circumstances or impose any mathematical for-
127 U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005).
128 Id. at 258.
129 Id. at 268.
130 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
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mulas.13 1 The circuit courts are to review sentences, under Booker,
based on an abuse of discretion standard. Gall establishes that the
Court really does intend the Guidelines to be regarded as only advi-
sory.
The second case, Kimbrough, like Gall, was a seven-to-two
decision.132 This was a case involving a district judge who departed
from the Guidelines recommendation in a crack cocaine case. I am
sure that many of you are aware that the United States Sentencing
Commission has been reviewing the one-hundred-to-one disparity in
the sentence a defendant could get for crack cocaine as opposed to
powder cocaine, in light of evidence that there is not that great a dif-
ference in the properties of the two drugs. 133 But there is a tremen-
dous difference in terms of disparate impact, because most of the de-
fendants in crack cocaine cases were black, and most of the
defendants in powder cocaine cases were white. 34 The Sentencing
Commission had been trying for years to get Congress to reduce this
disparity in sentencing. Congress had not wanted to and so, to some
extent, the Supreme Court did it for them.
The appellate court had ruled that the district judge could not
go around changing a defendant's sentence just because he disagreed
with the policies and Guidelines. 135 In an opinion by Justice Gins-
burg, the Court reversed, ruling that it was not "unreasonable" for the
sentencing judge to disagree with the Guidelines and the policy on
' Id. at 595.
132 Id. at 591; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 563.
133 Racial Inequity and Drug Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2008, at A18.
134 Id.
"3 Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 576.
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which they were based in a case like this; in the ordinary mine-run
case, Ginsburg said, the sentencing judge might not have as much
leeway. 136
More questions will undoubtedly arise about the implementa-
tion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines post-Booker, but Gall and
Kimbrough resolved some of the critical questions that had been
plaguing the lower federal courts.
V. MEDELLIN V. TEXAS
Finally, I want to introduce another important case, Medellin
v. Texas.137 Medellin was a Mexican citizen who was arrested in
Texas. As a person who was arrested in a foreign country, he had a
right under the Vienna Convention to have his consulate notified that
he had been arrested.1 38
I am sure you have heard the Vienna Convention mentioned
in some context. For many of us, it was when American citizen Lori
Berenson was arrested in Peru. Somebody in Peru was required to
tell the American consulate, and so American diplomats and lawyers
could come and help her defend herself in the Peruvian courts.13 9
The United States is a signatory to the Vienna Convention.1 40
When Mr. Medellin was tried, he apparently did not realize that he
had rights under the Vienna Convention because nobody told him
that. And by the time he managed to challenge the violation of the
136 Id. at 575-76.
'3 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
13 Id. at 1354.
139 Emily Gest & Corky Siemaszko, New Peru Terror Trial for New York Woman, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2008, at 2.
140 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
620 [Vol. 25
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss2/6
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DECISIONS
Vienna Convention, the Texas court held that he had procedurally de-
faulted on that claim.1
4
'
In round one on this issue, the Supreme Court had said that
the states are entitled to enforce their procedural default laws.
142
Subsequently, the International Court of Justice [ICJ] decided a case
holding that 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin, were
entitled to review and reconsideration of their state court convictions
and sentences in the United States, 143 because citizens should have
enforceable rights under the Vienna Convention. 144 Nobody had ever
told Medellin that he had the right to call his consulate, and his whole
case might have gone differently if he had had people from his consu-
late come out to assist him. The ICJ decision was both clear and spe-
cific about Medellin's case, whereas previous decisions had been
general. Mexico really went to bat for Medellin on this one. After
the ICJ decided this case, quite an amazing thing happened. Presi-
dent Bush said that the United States was going to discharge its inter-
national obligations by having the states give effect to that deci-
sion. 145 I would imagine that there had been some telephone calls
between Mexico and the White House. President Bush said, we rec-
ognize that we have signed the Vienna Convention; we will have the
state courts respect its requirements. 146 There may have been pres-
sure on him, not only from Mexico, but from people arguing (as
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1389.
143 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Judgment of Mar. 31), see 128 S. Ct. at 1376-77.
144 128 S. Ct. at 1355 n.1.
145 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1355.
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members of the military argued about Guantanamo) that if we do not
comply with our Vienna Treaty obligations, what will happen when
Americans are arrested abroad? 147 But the Texas courts did not wish
to comply, and the Supreme Court held in a six-to-three decision that
Texas could continue to value its procedural default law above the
terms of the treaty. 14
8
The Court ruled that Texas did not have to help to implement
the Vienna Convention for two reasons. The first was essentially that
the President does not have the power to preempt state law in the ab-
sence of congressional authorization. Even though this was a matter
concerning a treaty, the Court did not view the President as having
the power to require Texas to give up its state procedural default law
in order to comply with the Convention. The Court ruled that only
Congress would have the power to implement the treaty by preempt-
ing state law. 1
49
The second part of the holding was that the Vienna Conven-
tion is not self-executing (an argument familiar from some recent de-
cisions concerning the Geneva Conventions). 150 There were also two
other treaties involved in Medellin in addition to the Vienna Conven-
tion. 151
Justice Breyer said in dissent that there should not have been
any additional legislation necessary because this treaty operated di-
147 ABC News, Bush Overruled in Death Penalty Dispute: Supreme Court Says Bush Over-
stepped Authority by Intervening in Mexican Nat'/ Case (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/SCOTUS/story?id=4520197.
'
48 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356.
149 Id. at 1352-53.
151 Id. at 1368-69.
151 Id. at 1358.
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rectly on the courts. 15 2 This analysis is reminiscent of Justice John
Marshall telling the Virginia Supreme Court in the foundational case
of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee that it was doing the wrong thing by
prioritizing Virginia real estate law above the provisions of a federal
treaty. 153
I thought it was interesting that the Medellin decision was six-
to-three, that the majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Rob-
erts, and that the Court found that President Bush's exercise of his
foreign affairs power-which he evidently saw as an attempt to safe-
guard Americans abroad by trying to reciprocally implement the
treaty that the United States had signed-was trumped by federalism.
This was a rare case where Chief Justice Roberts was forced to make
a Sophie's Choice between his allegiance to executive authority and
his belief in federalism. It is telling that federalism prevailed.
That is my presentation of the criminal procedure cases of the
2007 term.
15 2 Id. at 1391.
153 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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